This article was written by our partner, TreasuryView
SMBs often run their debt and treasury operations through fragile Excel setups, relying on one “spreadsheet expert.” When that person leaves, reporting, compliance, and liquidity management are at risk.
The good news? Finance teams can get enterprise-level benefits – like centralized debt visibility, automated reporting, audit readiness, and scenario modeling – without enterprise cost or IT burden. Modern SMB-focused treasury tools deliver the clarity and continuity you need to scale safely.
In many SMBs, treasury management revolves around one person’s spreadsheets. They know the formulas, the models, the reporting deadlines. Everyone else just hopes the files keep working.
But when that person leaves, or is simply unavailable, operations can stall. Forecasts break, interest schedules slip, and errors creep into reports. Recruitment costs are high enough, but the hidden cost of lost financial knowledge — missed deadlines, bank relationship strain, and audit stress — is far higher.
Ca 80% of TreasuryView users have experienced key-people leaving and leaving down the mess. Or acknowledge people leaving as a major risk. There are several risks managing your debt portfolio in Spreadsheet.
SMB finance teams, You don’t need a giant treasury system to professionalize your debt and treasury management.
The benefits that matter most to SMBs are practical and measurable:
These are the advantages that help SMBs grow with confidence — without carrying the baggage of enterprise-grade software.
SMB finance team people, by TreasuryView example, love that everything’s in one place, so I’m not bouncing between different tools or doing tedious manual work. It’s a total time-saver and lets me focus on the bigger picture.
Getting enterprise-level benefits doesn’t mean ripping everything out. SMBs can take practical steps to build resilience and visibility:
90% of the TreasuryView new users start from Spreadsheet, but 10% have just the bunch of pdfs and conracts they can not handle any more. The need for a centralized platform is nessecity.
Enterprise TMS platforms are built for global corporates, with modules SMBs will never use.
What SMB finance teams really need is enterprise-level clarity without enterprise overhead — the benefits that matter day-to-day:
TreasuryView is designed as the central layer of an SMB treasury-lite stack:
It replaces the chaos of spreadsheets with a secure, audit-ready source of truth — without the burden of a full TMS.
Ritish S., Small-Business (50 or fewer emp.), Source: G2
A treasury-lite approach works for 95% of SMBs.
Relying on one spreadsheet expert is not a long-term strategy. It’s a risk. SMB finance teams can protect themselves — and professionalize — by capturing their treasury knowledge, automating routine reporting, and adopting the right-sized system.
The result: enterprise-level visibility and control, delivered in a way that fits SMB teams.
Treasury Masterminds is a community of professionals working in treasury management or those interested in learning more about various topics related to treasury management, including cash management, foreign exchange management, and payments. To register and connect with Treasury professionals, click the button below.
This article was written by our content partner, Deaglo
Direct answers to the 10 most common questions PE fund CFOs and COOs ask when structuring, documenting, and reporting a currency hedge program — with specific numbers, instrument mechanics, and accounting treatment for Brazil-focused funds.
Hedging USD/BRL for a $200M fund typically costs 8–14% per annum in carry, reflecting Brazil’s interest rate differential with the US (historically 8–12 percentage points). For a 12-month NDF at current rates, expect an all-in cost of roughly $16M–$28Mannually — or 200–350 basis points once amortized. Costs compress with shorter tenors and expand during BRL volatility spikes. Broker spreads on NDF notionals of $50M+ are usually 10–20 pips. Most PE CFOs hedge 50–75% of net equity exposure, reducing the effective cost while retaining some upside currency participation.
A Non-Deliverable Forward (NDF) settles in USD at maturity based on the USD/BRL fixing rate (PTAX), with no physical exchange of reais. It is the only viable structure for BRL, since Brazil restricts offshore deliverability of its currency. A deliverable forward, used for currencies like EUR or GBP, involves actual exchange of both currencies at settlement. For PE funds holding Brazilian portfolio companies, NDFs are the standard hedging instrument. They carry counterparty credit risk (mark-to-market exposure) and are typically governed by ISDA Master Agreements with scheduled PTAX fixings published by Brazil’s central bank.
To qualify for IFRS 9 hedge accounting, a CFO must:
(1) formally designate the hedging relationship at inception with written documentation identifying the hedged item, hedging instrument, risk being hedged, and hedge ratio
(2) demonstrate the hedge meets the 80–125% effectiveness threshold using prospective and retrospective testing
(3) establish a risk management objective and strategy consistent with the designation. For USD/BRL NDFs, the hedged item is typically the foreign currency risk on net investment in a Brazilian subsidiary. Ineffectiveness from basis differences (e.g., PTAX vs. spot) flows through OCI. Rebalancing is permitted under IFRS 9 without dedesignation. US-domiciled funds applying US GAAP use ASC 815, which has broadly similar designation and effectiveness testing requirements but distinct rules around shortcut method eligibility and critical terms matching — confirm with your accounting team which standard applies.
Most PE funds targeting EM currencies hedge 50–75% of NAV-equivalent equity exposure. A 100% hedge eliminates currency upside and creates cash flow risk if BRL appreciates sharply (requiring margin or variation margin top-ups). A 0% hedge maximizes return volatility. The optimal ratio depends on the fund’s return attribution target, LP investor base currency, and whether currency risk is considered a strategic or incidental exposure. Funds with USD-denominated performance fees often hedge more aggressively to protect carried interest calculations. Quarterly rebalancing of the ratio to track changing portfolio valuations is considered best practice.
PE funds should execute BRL NDFs with tier-1 banks active in EM FX: JPMorgan, Citi, Goldman Sachs, Santander Brasil, Ebury, Macquarie, BTG Pactual, and Itaú BBA are the most liquid dealers for USD/BRL. For funds below $500M AUM, it is common to maintain two to three ISDA relationships to ensure competitive pricing and avoid single-counterparty credit concentration. Credit Support Annexes (CSAs) with two-way variation margin posting reduce bilateral credit exposure. Smaller funds may access NDF liquidity through FX prime brokers or aggregators rather than direct ISDA relationships. Execution via a multi-dealer platform (360T, Bloomberg, FXall) improves price discovery.
BRL implied volatility (1-month ATM typically 15–25%) directly affects option-based hedges but not the carry cost of NDFs. NDF costs are driven by interest rate differentials, not vol. However, high vol environments widen bid-offer spreads and increase the cost of rolling hedges. NDFs should be rolled 2–5 business days before expiry to avoid settlement risk at PTAX fixing. Rolling during thin liquidity windows (early morning NY, Brazil holidays) increases slippage. Most PE treasuries set rolling schedules quarterly or semi-annually aligned with valuation cycles. Avoid rolling at quarter-end when dealer balance sheets are constrained and spreads widen.
Under an IFRS 9 cash flow hedge:
(1) At inception, the NDF is recorded at fair value (typically zero).
(2) Each reporting period, mark-to-market gains or losses on the effective portion go to OCI (Other Comprehensive Income), not P&L.
(3) The ineffective portion is immediately recognized in P&L.
(4) When the hedged transaction affects P&L (e.g., dividend repatriation or exit proceeds), the cumulative OCI amount is reclassified to P&L. The time value of the NDF (if material) may be accounted for separately. Ensure PTAX-based NDF fixing is aligned with the functional currency of the hedged subsidiary to minimize basis ineffectiveness. US-domiciled funds using ASC 815 follow largely parallel journal entries but should confirm treatment with the fund’s accounting team, as rules on OCI reclassification triggers and the accounting for excluded components differ from IFRS 9.
Yes. USD put / BRL call options provide asymmetric protection — the fund pays a premium upfront (typically 3–8% of notional for 12-month 10-delta puts) and retains upside if BRL strengthens. Options are preferable when the fund has uncertain exit timing or binary outcome risk (e.g., pending M&A). Collars (buying puts, selling calls) reduce premium cost to near-zero while capping upside. Under IFRS 9, only the intrinsic value of the option is designated in the hedging relationship; time value is accounted for separately in OCI and amortized. BRL options are also non-deliverable (called NDOs) and settle at PTAX in the same way as NDFs. Whether margin is required depends on the trade structure and the fund’s CSA setup with the bank; all NDO trades require ISDA documentation.
Portfolio company valuations use BRL Running a BRL NDF program exposes PE funds to several operational and market risks beyond FX exposure itself.
(1) Counterparty credit risk — open NDF positions accumulate mark-to-market exposure with dealer banks; mitigated by executing across 2–3 ISDA counterparties with two-way CSAs and daily variation margin.
(2) Roll and liquidity risk — rolling NDFs at quarter-end or around Brazilian holidays increases spread cost by 5–15 pips; avoided by scheduling rolls 2–5 business days before fixing and staggering maturities.
(3) Over-hedge / margin call risk — if BRL appreciates materially, losing NDF positions trigger cash variation margin calls, creating liquidity pressure; managed by maintaining a cash reserve equal to 10–15% of hedge notional.
(4) Exit timing mismatch — portfolio company sales may close weeks before or after NDF maturities, leaving an unmatched directional position; managed by maintaining short-dated NDF overlay positions for imminent exits.
(5) Operational risk — incorrect PTAX fixing date elections, wrong settlement instructions, or missed confirmation deadlines can cause settlement failure; mitigated by standardized ISDA confirmations, pre-settlement checklists, and independent confirmation matching.
LPs increasingly expect transparent FX hedge disclosure covering:
(1) hedge program objectives and policy (% of NAV hedged, permitted instruments, tenor limits)
(2) total notional outstanding by currency pair
(3) unrealized mark-to-market gain or loss on open positions
(4) realized hedge P&L for the period and its contribution to net returns
(5) hedge cost drag in basis points on gross IRR
(6) counterparty names and credit ratings. Under ILPA guidelines, FX derivatives should be disclosed with the fair value hierarchy classification (typically Level 2). Some funds include a sensitivity table showing NAV impact per 10% BRL move, hedged vs. unhedged.
Treasury Masterminds is a community of professionals working in treasury management or those interested in learning more about various topics related to treasury management, including cash management, foreign exchange management, and payments. To register and connect with Treasury professionals, click the button below.
This article is written by our partner, Cobase
For decades, large international banks have positioned themselves as gateways to the global financial system. Their pitch is straightforward: one partner, global reach, consistent service. For multinational corporates, the appeal is obvious – simplify banking by consolidating relationships.
But beneath the branding, the idea of a truly “global” bank starts to unravel.
The limitation is not ambition or scale. It is jurisdiction.
Banks do not operate across borders in the way technology companies or logistics networks do. They expand into countries, but once there, they become subject to local rules – rules that define, often in granular detail, what services they can provide, how they provide them, and to whom.
What emerges is less a single institution and more a network of locally regulated entities, loosely stitched together under a common name.
That distinction matters.
A corporate working with a global bank across Europe, Asia, and the Americas might expect a consistent experience. Instead, they encounter variation at almost every layer. A payment setup that works seamlessly in the Netherlands may require adjustments in the United States. A liquidity structure available in London may not be permitted in Mumbai. Even something as routine as onboarding can turn into a multi-country exercise, with separate documentation, timelines, and approval processes for each jurisdiction.
In some cases, the gaps are subtle. A bank may offer ISO 20022 payment formats globally, but local implementations differ. Files accepted in one country may fail in another, not because the standard changed, but because interpretation did. Error handling, cut-off times, and processing logic follow local conventions, not global ones.
In other cases, the limitations are more explicit.
Take liquidity management. In theory, a multinational corporate should be able to centralise cash across accounts worldwide, optimising funding and reducing idle balances. In practice, that depends heavily on where the cash sits. European markets allow relatively sophisticated pooling structures, including notional pooling across entities. Move into markets like China or India, and those structures quickly encounter restrictions. Capital controls, regulatory approvals, and tax considerations can prevent funds from being moved freely or at all.
The result is a familiar problem for treasury teams: cash that exists, but cannot be used.
Payments tell a similar story. While a global bank may offer local payment capabilities in dozens of countries, it does not always control the full chain. In markets where it lacks direct access to domestic clearing systems, it relies on local correspondent banks. For the corporate client, this dependency is largely invisible until something goes wrong. Delays, additional fees, and reconciliation issues emerge, often without clear transparency into where in the chain the problem occurred.
In certain regions, even data becomes fragmented. Regulatory regimes increasingly require financial data to be stored and processed locally. For global banks, this means that account information, transaction data, and reporting cannot always be fully centralised. A corporate attempting to build a real-time, global view of its cash position may find that some pieces simply cannot be integrated in the same way as others.
And then there are the markets where global banks are only partially present or absent altogether.
In parts of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, even the largest international banks rely on partnerships with domestic institutions. In these cases, the “global” relationship effectively stops at the border, and the corporate is pulled back into the very fragmentation it was trying to avoid.
None of this is accidental. It reflects the underlying structure of the financial system.
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Banking is, at its core, a nationally regulated industry. Governments retain control over their financial systems for reasons that go beyond efficiency: monetary policy, financial stability, capital controls, and oversight. These priorities impose boundaries that even the largest banks cannot cross.
The consequence is a persistent gap between how corporates operate and how banks are structured. Corporates expand internationally and expect their infrastructure to scale with them. Banks expand internationally but remain constrained locally.
This is why even the most sophisticated multinationals rarely rely on a single banking partner. They build networks—combining global banks for reach, regional banks for depth, and local banks for access. Integration becomes their responsibility.
And that is where a different type of solution has started to emerge.
Rather than trying to replace banks or force uniformity where it cannot exist, platforms like Cobase sit above this fragmented landscape and act as an integration layer. They connect to multiple banks—global and local, across channels such as SWIFT, EBICS, APIs, and host-to-host, and standardise how corporates interact with them.
In that model, the complexity of dealing with multiple banking entities does not disappear, but it is absorbed. Payment formats are converted automatically to meet bank-specific requirements. Differences in file structures, validation rules, and communication protocols are handled centrally. Data coming back from banks—balances, transactions, statuses is normalised into a consistent format.
The effect is not that a corporate suddenly has a “global bank.”
It is that it gains a single, controlled interface across many banks.
This distinction is subtle, but important. The fragmentation remains at the infrastructure level where it is dictated by regulation and market structure, but it is no longer fully exposed at the operational level.
In that sense, the role of integration shifts. It moves away from trying to find the one bank that can do everything, toward building a layer that can manage many banks as if they were one.
The “global bank,” then, is less a reality than an abstraction.
What corporates increasingly build instead is their own version of it—on top of the system as it actually exists.
Treasury Masterminds is a community of professionals working in treasury management or those interested in learning more about various topics related to treasury management, including cash management, foreign exchange management, and payments. To register and connect with Treasury professionals, click the button below.
This article is written by our partner, FIS
Receivables finance (RF) has long been a cornerstone of corporate finance, enabling businesses to convert outstanding invoices into immediate liquidity. By selling their receivables to a funder, companies may access cost-effective funding and reduce risk, while investors may gain exposure to short-duration, diversified assets at a competitive return.
However, as recent events surrounding First Brands Group illustrate, this structure remains vulnerable to risks beyond credit, such as fraud. These vulnerabilities highlight the need for greater scrutiny and the adoption of new technologies.
Fraud in RF transactions typically manifests through misrepresentation of receivables quality, double pledging of assets and fabrication of invoices. These risks arise because RF relies heavily on the integrity of the originator’s reporting and servicing processes. If invoices are falsified or pledged to multiple financiers, the asset base becomes compromised, exposing investors and lenders to significant losses.
The First Brands case underscores these vulnerabilities. The U.S. auto parts supplier, which filed for Chapter 11 reorganization in September 2025, allegedly engaged in widespread financial misconduct, including doctoring invoices and double-counting receivables to secure billions of dollars in financing.
Several market features of RF contribute to fraud risk:
These factors can make RF particularly vulnerable when governance fails or liquidity pressures incentivize aggressive accounting.
The First Brands saga has accelerated calls for digital transformation in RF oversight. Advanced technology and reporting platforms can reduce fraud risk through:
The collapse of First Brands is a cautionary tale for all stakeholders in the RF ecosystem. While RF remains a powerful liquidity tool, its resilience depends on effective governance and technological safeguards. Platforms that deliver real-time transparency, automated controls and immutable records are no longer optional: They are essential to maintaining trust and confidence in this asset.
In essence, resilient frameworks are often built on digital efficiency and the irreplaceable insight of experienced practitioners.
As institutional investors continue to seek exposure to trade finance assets and corporates aim to unlock working capital, the combination of advanced technology and human expertise within complex RF structures will help to shape the market’s future.
While digitalization may stand as the frontline defense against fraud, it’s equally vital to maintain effective human oversight by having seasoned professionals conduct independent reviews and engage in regular dialog with originators and funders.
This interplay between technological innovation and expert judgment helps ensure that not only are anomalies flagged automatically, but also the nuances of complex transactions are properly understood and addressed. In essence, resilient frameworks are often built on digital efficiency and the irreplaceable insight of experienced practitioners.
Treasury Masterminds is a community of professionals working in treasury management or those interested in learning more about various topics related to treasury management, including cash management, foreign exchange management, and payments. To register and connect with Treasury professionals, click the button below.
